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DRAFT 
 
 
Abstract:  That income inequality has a number of social and political effects has been well documented.  
In view of the rapid rise in interpersonal and interregional inequality in Russia in the past two decades, 
this paper seeks to answer three questions.  First, descriptively, what are the trends in interregional 
income inequality in Russia and how do they compare to those in China and other large countries?  
Second, how are interregional and interpersonal inequality related?  Finally, how have social and 
economic policies shaped interregional inequality?  The paper compares Russia with China, although it 
also draws comparisons to inequality in the United States and other large, heterogeneous countries.  In 
both Russia and China, the growth in interregional inequality has levelled off somewhat in the last few 
years (at least by some measures) but remains high by international standards.  Income inequality is 
fueled by the widening differentials in earnings, a consequence of the economic reform strategies both 
countries have followed. Territorial centers of growth, particularly metropolitan centers and natural 
resource-rich regions, experience faster rates of average income growth than rural and peripheral regions, 
fueling income inequality across regions.  Both Russia and China lack significant fiscal redistributive 
mechanisms, although government policy has mitigated some of the extremes of social and interregional 
inequality by shoring up incomes at the low end and through targeted government infra-structure 
investment intended to raise incomes in poorer regions.  However, in both countries, the decentralization, 
commercialization and privatization of public services has reinforced rather than offset inequality 
generated in the labor market.  Social policy in the area of pensions, unemployment and poverty 
assistance aims at preventing social unrest rather than being a source of broad-based economic growth. I 
conclude by arguing that the absence of effective mechanisms for aggregating broad social interests and 
resolving redistributive conflicts, either corporatist or parliamentary,  leaves the state poorly equipped to 
use social policies to redress interpersonal and interregional inequality except through targeted state 
spending programs.   
 
The Significance of Inequality 
 
 Evidence from many countries demonstrates that inequality is related to a number of social 
pathologies, such as differential infant mortality rates, homicide, heart disease, and other social 
pathologies—even after controlling for aggregate and individual-level income.1 More generally, as Kate 
Pickett and Richard Wilkinson put it, “the steeper the social gradient a problem has within society [that is, 
the more it reflects differences in wealth, power and status], the more strongly it will be related to 
inequality.”2  In the United States, for example, there is a strong correlation between infant mortality and 
income inequality at the state level (Figure 1): 
 
Figure 1: United States: Infant Mortality Rates by State Income Inequality, 2006 
 
 
 
 
This relationship holds up even after controlling for state income levels and the black share of the 
population (Figure 2): 
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Figure 2: Predicted Infant Mortality Rates by Inequality 
 
 
 
The United States data also show a modest association between the level of income inequality in a state 
and the state’s overall level of health.  The latter is measured by state-level survey data indicating the 
average number of healthy days experienced by the citizens of the state.  Figure 3 illustrates the bivariate 
relationship: 
 
 3 
Figure 3: Mean Health by State by Income Inequality, 2007 
 
 
 
As the figure shows, the populations of Washington, DC, New York, and Connecticut, which have very 
high levels of income inequality, have higher mean numbers of healthy days than would be predicted, 
while citizens in border and southern states have many fewer healthy days than the state levels of income 
inequality would predict.   
 
However, an extraordinarily close relationship exists between the mean number of healthy days in 
a state and the inequality among its citizens in the number of healthy days they report experiencing.  In 
other words, as Figure 4 shows, a state with high inequality in the levels of health has higher overall 
levels of health.  The correlation is nearly perfect (Figure 4):
 3
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Figure 4: Inequality in Health by State by Mean Health 
 
 
In other words, the quality of public health appears to reflect externalities from individual-level health.  
Interaction among individuals in a population with relatively equal levels of health produces a 
convergence toward a higher common level of health for all of them, whereas when a population is 
segmented among groups with very different levels of health, overall health in the state is lower.  This 
provides some support for the controversial social status explanation for health-related pathologies argued 
for by Richard Wilkinson.
4
   
Whatever the explanation, it seems incontrovertible that some forms of inequality have effects on 
individuals that are felt at the aggregate level.  Robert Dahl has likewise observed that “human beings are 
naturally endowed with a sensitivity to the unequal distribution of rewards to others whom they view as 
comparable to themselves in relevant ways.”5  The key here is “comparability.”  If profound inequalities 
in income, status, and wealth in a community undermine the sense of likeness, empathy or fairness, it is 
likely that the community will undertake less effort to equalize the conditions resulting in inequality.  This 
is a possible explanation for the often-cited finding that societies polarized around income, social class, 
race, ethnicity, or other deep distinctions among groups are less inclined to tax themselves to supply 
public goods and services.
6
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Russia, interestingly, exhibits the opposite pattern to that of the United States or other countries.  
In Russia, indicators such as infant mortality and life expectancy, particularly for men, are also related to 
a region’s level of income inequality, but the relationship is perverse: the higher the inequality, the lower 
the infant mortality (and the higher the life expectancy, an even stronger relation!) (Figure 5): 
 
Figure 5: Russia: Infant Mortality by Region by Income Inequality, 2006    
 
 
 
However, once the region’s mean real income level is held constant, the relationship becomes 
insignificant.  Inequality is, on the other hand, related to regional differences in levels of democracy, even 
once controls for income and other social and economic factors (such as poverty or natural resource 
wealth) are controlled for.  That is, more unequal regions in Russia have more democratic regimes.  I have 
explored the reasons for this relationship elsewhere.
7
  Briefly, I argue that income inequality is greater 
where earnings at the  upper end of the wage scale are higher, and that this tends to be found in regions 
where, owing to the greater security of political and property rights, employers are freer to pay (and 
report!) higher earnings to higher-level employees.  Therefore poorer regions have lower inequality, but 
they also have more predatory and authoritarian regimes, lower social spending, lower investment, and 
lower growth. 
 In this paper I treat inequality as the outcome of a set of interacting regime, political and economic 
factors that, in turn, have implications for the longer-term development of the polity. I seek to address 
three questions: First, descriptively, what are the trends in interregional income inequality in Russia and 
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how do they compare to those in China and other large countries?  Second, how are interregional and 
interpersonal inequality related?  Finally, how have social and economic policies shaped interregional 
inequality?  The paper compares Russia with China, although it also draws comparisons to inequality in 
the United States and other large, heterogeneous countries.  I find that in both Russia and China, the 
growth in interregional inequality has abated somewhat in the last few years by some measures, but not 
by all; and that for both, interregional inequality remains high by international standards.  Income 
inequality is fueled by the widening differentials in earnings, a consequence of the economic reform 
strategies both countries have followed. Territorial centers of growth, particularly metropolitan centers 
and natural resource-rich regions, experience faster rates of average income growth than rural and 
hinterland regions, fueling income inequality across regions.  Both countries lack significant fiscal 
redistributive mechanisms, although government policy has mitigated some of the extremes of social and 
interregional inequality by shoring up incomes at the low end and through targeted government infra-
structure investment intended to raise incomes in poorer regions.  However, in both countries, the 
decentralization, commercialization and privatization of public services has reinforced rather than offset 
inequality generaed in the labor market; social policy in the area of pensions, unemployment and poverty 
assistance serves a defensive goal of preventing social unrest rather than being a source of broad-based 
economic growth. 
 
 
Strategies of Reform in Russia and China 
 
 The conventional view holds that Russia attempted to democratize its polity and liberalize its 
economy simultaneously, failing at both, whereas China’s incremental reforms have minimized 
distributional tension through rapid growth, while preserving central administrative control.  There is 
obviously much validity to this view.  A sharp economic contraction followed the end of the Soviet 
regime in all the successor states.  In Russia, economic output fell by as much as half over the 1990s, 
thrusting as many as 40% of the population into poverty.  State capacity fell.  Oligarchs, regional bosses 
and organized crime subverted government power.  Mortality rates, especially among working-age males, 
shot up to levels unheard of in peacetime.
8
 Economic recovery came only after a financial crash devalued 
the ruble and even was largely based on natural resource exports while the feeble democratization of the 
1990s gave way to a revived authoritarianism in the 2000s.
9
 A 2011 report by the Higher School of 
Economics in Moscow paints a sobering portrait of the net change in the country’s living standards over 
the first two decades of reform.  Once the changes in relative prices were accounted for, the authors found 
that by 2009, GDP was only 8% higher than it had been in 1990, and aggregate consumption was only 
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45% higher.
10
  Some 40% of the population had experienced a net decline in living standards while only 
40% saw a net improvement.   
 For China specialists, it is axiomatic that Russia’s record demonstrates the failure of its model of 
reform.  Most would agree with Susan Shirk that: “the Soviet strategy of political reform before economic 
reform produced political chaos and disintegration and a decline in living standards and growth rates” or 
Dali Yang’s assessment that “Russia’s shock therapy did not produce a sound market economy but 
instead a sort of anarchic capitalism riddled with corruption” or Minxin Pei’s judgment that “of course, 
the big-bang approach has failed miserably in Russia.”11   
 The apparent contrast with China’s reforms could scarcely be starker.  According to Shirk, “By the 
end of the 1980s the Chinese strategy of of economic reform without political reform appeared to have 
worked, at least in overall economic terms.”12  China’s combination of liberalization, privatization, and 
decentralization, while retaining communist party control, is commonly believed to have created 
incentives for party and state officials to encourage investment and entrepreneurship and attract enormous 
volumes of foreign investment. Meantime the authorities used the residual coercive capacity of the state to 
prevent redistributive pressures from blocking growth while constraining government from preying on 
enterprise.  Although there is doubt about the exact figures, Barry Naughton estimates that GDP per capita 
(in PPP terms expressed in constant US dollars) rose seven-fold between 1978 and 2004, which implies 
an average annual growth rate of 8.1%.
13
  Incomes rose for all sections of the population. Wang Feng 
estimates that urban incomes rose, in real terms, 2.4 times between 1985 and 2000, while rural incomes 
rose 1.8 times.
14
  Chinese official figures, which must be treated with considerable skepticism, indicate a 
quintupling of incomes for both urban and rural households between 1978 and 2004.
15
 Qin Gao and Carl 
Riskin estimate that urban household incomes, adjusted for  inflation, doubled over the period from 1988 
to 2002, and that rural household incomes rose 70% over the same period.
16
 The number of people living 
in poverty fell from something like 400 million in 1978 to 100 million today.
17
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 One major line of explanation for the differing outcomes between Russia and China contrasts the 
way administrative decentralization has been carried out in the two countries.  For Barry Weingast and his 
co-authors, China represents a model of “market-preserving federalism.”18 This interpretation holds that 
the enormous decentralization of control over economic regulation and social welfare administration that 
China carried out in the 1980s and 1990s, together with liberalization and the establishment of property 
rights, enabled the country  to institute a self-reinforcing competition among provincial and lower 
governments that restrains state predation on business and encourages productive investment.
19
 In contrast, 
Russia’s experience with liberalization and decentralization is associated with the abandonment of both 
social welfare responsibilities and political control over economic reform, with disastrous consequences.
20
  
In Steven Solnick’s terms, the loss of central control in Russia resembled a bank run, in that stake-holders 
with control over party and state institutions rushed to cash in their assets through privatization and a 
breakup of the union before nothing was left, whereas China retained a sufficient degree of central control 
so as to restrain such behavior.
21
 
 In the absence of clear and objective performance indicators, close observers can read the same 
evidence in fundamentally different ways.
 22
  For Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, for example, 
“although Russia’s transition has been painful in many ways and its economic and political systems 
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remain far from perfect, the country has made remarkable economic and social progress.  Russia’s 
remaining defects are typical of countries at its level of economic development.”23  China’s record is 
equally ambiguous.  Many observers take the view that China has retained its capacity to guide economic 
reform and manage its far-reaching consequences. Dali Yang, for example, argues that whatever the 
strains of the 1980s and early 1990s, since then “China has made substantial progress in improving the 
institutional framework for economic governance.”24  On the basis of a close study of CCP cadre 
appointment policy, Pierre Landry concludes that “the carefully controlled process of economic and 
administrative decentralization actually has strengthened the regime.”25 
 Notwithstanding the conventional wisdom, the two countries’ paths of reform share some 
important similarities.  It is the case that in Russia, the pension system has remained centrally controlled 
and covers the entire population whereas in China it is highly decentralized, and until very recently, 
covered only the urban population.
26
 Nonetheless, both countries have substantially decentralized and 
commercialized their social welfare systems.  Intent on putting as much of the social benefits system on a 
market footing as possible, through private pension savings, fee-for-service systems of education and 
healthcare, and the privatization of housing, both governments have also attempted to maintain and 
expand some state-provided cash benefits, particularly pensions.  But the aging of the population, the tacit 
and overt refusal by employers and employees to pay their required social insurance contributions, and the 
cronyistic, collusive relations between local governments and major firms in their jurisdictions have 
undermined the government’s reform plans. In both countries, fearful of permitting mass layoffs from 
local state-owned and collective enterprises, local governments have allowed firms to avoid paying some 
or all of their mandatory social insurance contributions and have resorted to other, informal means of 
raising revenues.  In China, in particular, local governments have relied heavily on “off-budget funds” 
that are outside regular budget scrutiny.  Moreover, as Christine Wong’s research shows, as local 
governments in China put more social services on a private, market-based footing, increases in collected 
fees go to raise officials’ salaries rather than to improve or subsidize services.27   The combination of 
decentralization of economic and social policy with the commercialization and privatization of many 
formerly public services (among them employment security, education, health care, and housing) have led 
to sharply increasing interpersonal, therefore interregional, income inequality.    
 Rising inequality, in turn, feeds back into the political process itself by raising the difficulty for 
policy-makers of imposing fiscal arrangements that would meet resistance from the winners of reform.  In 
short, for both countries, the effects of liberalization, privatization, and decentralization raise the 
possibility that, for both countries, the result of reform in the social welfare sphere is not “market-
preserving federalism” but a form of post-socialist liberalism that treats social policy as a defense against 
social instability rather than a source of broad-based growth. In particular, a significant result of the 
combination of decentralization with the privatization of economic activity and social services has been a 
substantial and, from the standpoint of the leaders, dangerous, rise in interpersonal and interregional 
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inequality.  In China, virtually all strata of the population have seen a net increase in income as a result of 
the market reforms, whereas in Russia, a sizable proportion of the population remains net losers.  Yet in 
both countries, the growng gap between those who are the greatest net winners and the middle and lower 
strata has prompted policy-makers to respond by expanding income and benefits for the poorest strata and 
by investing in state projects intended to raise incomes in distressed regions, but not by creating 
alternative institutional arrangements for pooling the benefits and risks of economic growth broadly 
between business and labor, or rich and poor.   
 
  
Measuring Inequality 
 
 Although growth benefited nearly all strata in China and the top two quintiles in Russia, both 
Russia and China saw a considerable increase in aggregate income inequality in the last two decades.  
This was associated with the much greater growth of incomes in the higher income brackets than in the 
middle and lower brackets.  As in the United States and other English-speaking democracies, incomes 
have risen fastest in the very highest income brackets--the top percentile.
28
  Atkinson and Piketty estimate 
that the share of total pre-tax income received by the top 1% of income earners in China more than 
doubled between 1986 and 2003, from 2.65% to 5.87% of all income.  The top decile’s share of total 
income rose from about 17% to about 28% over the same period, a smaller percentage increase.  (By 
comparison, the top percentile in  the US saw an increase in the same period from 9.13% of income to 
14.87%, and the top decile from 34.57% to  42.04%.
29
)  Russia does not report income figures for the top 
percentile, but it reports income figures by quintile distribution, decile ratios, and Gini indexes.  However, 
it is evident that the same trend toward the concentration of income gains in the very highest income 
brackets from various press reports.  For instance, a report by Rosgosstrakh, the state insurance company, 
found that from 2006 to 2007, the number of households with incomes in excess of $1 million (US) had 
doubled, from 100,000 to 200,000.  The number of households with incomes between $125,000 and 
250,000 US per year had risen 64%, faster than the increase in the number of households receiving 
between $16,000 and 25,000 per year had only risen 13%.
30
  This was at a time when the median 
individual income was only about $3600 per year.   
 Russia has reported Gini indexes and decile ratios (ie the ratio of the top decile to the bottom) 
since 1992.  (NB: I have converted Gini indexes so that all are expressed as numbers between 1 and 100, 
where 100 represents maximum theoretical inequality and 1 represents minimum inequality.)  Over that 
period, as Figure xx indicates, aggregate inequality as measured by the decile coefficient has 
approximately doubled.  Measured by the Gini index, it has risen about 46%.  Since the Gini index is 
more sensitive to deviations from inequality in the middle of the income spectrum, and the decile ratio a 
better measure of movement of incomes at the top of the distribution, we can infer that Russian inequality 
is better measured by the decile ratio than the Gini index (Figure 6).
31
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Figure 6: Aggregate Interpersonal Inequality in Russia, 1992-2009 
 
 
 
 China’s reported estimates of aggregate inequality are far less reliable. Gini index estimates vary 
widely.  Barry Naughton estimtes that China’s Gini index reached 44.7 by 2001.32 Yasheng Huang cites a 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences estimate for 2006 of 49.6.
33
 Qin Gao and Carl Riskin, using a 
household income survey that imputes the value of social benefits, including the rental value of owner-
occupied housing, estimate separate Gini coefficients for urban and rural households as well as the 
households of migrant workers living in cities.  For 2002, they estimate a Gini for urban households of 35, 
for rural households of 37, and for migrant workers of 38.
34
 Martin King Whyte, in his recent book, Myth 
of the Social Volcano, cites an estimate of the Gini index for 2002 of 45 “or even higher” (from a figure of 
29 in 1981).
35
  The World Bank’s World Development Indicators reports an estimate of 42 for 2005.  The 
UN Human Development Report estimates the Gini index stood at  46.9 for 2007-2008.
36
  Wang Feng 
estimates that over the period from 1986 to 2000, income inequality for urban employees doubled if 
measured by the Gini index, and quadrupled if measured by the Theil index (which is more sensitive to 
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changes at the extremes of the distribution).
37
 The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences reported in 2006 
that “‘The Gini coefficient, an indicator of income disparities, reached 0.53 last year, far higher than a 
dangerous level of 0.4.”38   
  
 For China, we can use the Gao-Riskin CHIP data as well as fragmentary figures reported by 
China’s provincial statistical yearbooks to get some idea of the way income growth has affected income 
distribution.  Table 1A reports the Gao-Riskin estimates of Gini coefficients  for urban and rural 
households at the three time points, 1988, 1995 and 2002, showing a substantial increase in inequality in 
the first period, followed by a decline in inequality for rural households and a slight increase for urban 
households.    
 
 
Table 1A: CHIP household survey income inequality estimates 
 
China: Gini index, 
aggregate income 
(CHIP estimates) 
1988 1995 2002 
Urban households  23 34 35 
Rural households  36 42 37 
 
Source: Gao, Qin and Carl Riskin, “Market versus Social Benefits: Explaining China’s Changing Income 
Inequality.” in Creating Wealth and Poverty in Postsocialist China. Deborah S. Davis and Feng Wang, 
Eds.  (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press 2009), Tables 2.2, 2.4, pp. 24, 31. 
  
 Table 1B is based on my calculations from figures provided by China’s provincial statistical 
yearbooks.  These usually report either decile or quintile distribution figures for income for various years 
(sometimes, in fact, they combine quintile and decile figures without explanation) for urban households.  
A few provinces report incomes by quintile for rural households.  The median province’s decile income 
ratio for urban households in 2008 was 8.3.  However, in most provinces, the bottom decile of income 
earners among urban households received slightly more than the average rural household in the same 
province.  This suggests that an accurate decile ratio between the top decile of urban households and the 
bottom decile of rural households would be much larger.  For those few provinces where we can calculate 
the ratio between the top decile of urban households and the bottom quintile of rural households, the 
ratios are, if anything, higher than the decile ratios reported for regions in Russia:  12.3 in Zhejiang 
province; 13.25 in Guangdong; 18.95 in Jiangsu.  These are of course among the richest provinces, 
suggesting that, as in Russia, the wealthiest regions also have the highest income inequality. An official 
report in 2010 claimed that the overall decile ratio of income had risen from 7.3 in 1988 to 23 in 2007.
 39
   
If true, that is a level higher by about 50% than Russia’s and about twice that of the United States. It is 
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reasonable to suppose, therefore that overall interpersonal income inequality in China is at least as great 
as that of Russia.  
 
 
Table 1B: Income and wage decile ratios, median region 
 
China: median region 2001 2008 
Decile ratio, disposable income, urban households, median 
province 
5.74 8.33 
Decile ratio, urban wage income, median province  6.65 
 
Source: Calculated from provincial statistical yearbooks 
 
 
  We can also examine interregional inequality for Russia and China using official figures.  There 
are various ways of doing so.  One is simply to calculate the ratio of the income or output of the richest to 
the poorest region.  The World Bank economist Branko Milanovic observes that the gap in the GDP per 
capita between China’s richest and poorest provinces (he includes Hong Kong in his calculation) is at 
least 10 to 1; this is higher than the inter-regional gap in Yugoslavia at the point of its breakup (8 to 1) or 
the Soviet Union on the eve of its breakup (6 to 1).  Milanovic concludes that “If there is ever a danger to 
Chinese national unity, it is very likely to come from the economic split within the nation.”40  Although 
he does not mention it, contemporary Russia’s interregional inequality, by the same measure, is still 
greater: in 2009, the GDP per capita of the richest region in Russia (Tiumen’ oblast’, a center of oil 
production) was more than 24 times higher than that of the poorest (Ingushetia, an impoverished ethnic 
republic neighboring Chechnia). This represents a substantial increase over 1995 (when the gap was 17.8), 
and is one reason Russian policy-makers worry about the possibility that Russia could break up as the 
Soviet Union did.
41
 
 More usual are other measures: the coefficient of variation (CV), a dimensionless statistic that 
divides the standard deviation of a distribution by its mean, allowing ready comparison of subnational 
differences in income among countries varying widely in overall income level.  Wang Shaoguang and Hu 
Angang use the CV to measure relative disparities across China’s provinces, and the standard deviation to 
measure absolute disparities.
42
  Writing in 1999, they note that although China entered the communist era 
with a pronounced skew in its regional levels of development, Maoist policy equalized interregional 
differences to some extent.  Still, even after three decades of Maoist policies, Shanghai’s per capita GDP 
was 14 times higher than that of the poorest province, Guizhou.
43
  Using the CV for GDP per capita, they 
compare China with other countries, including India and Indonesia, and find that China’s cross-regional 
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inequality was by far the highest of all the countries they considered.
44
 Oddly, they do not include Russia 
in their comparison.  As we shall see, China is by no means the world leader in interregional inequality 
once Russia is considered.  
 Two other measures are the Gini index (ie a measure of the degree to which the pairwise 
comparisons of regions’ mean incomes are equal or not) and the inter-quartile range (IQR), which 
measures the range of values falling between the top and bottom quartiles of all observations.  As we see 
in the following tables, which measure is used matters because different measures tell different stories as 
to whether interregional inequality in China is growing or not.  
 The tables compare interregional inequality using these four different measures for both gross 
regional output and mean regional income. The same measures--for income only--for the United States, 
Brazil and India are reported as well for the sake of comparison. 
 
Table 2A: Russia: Gross Regional Product per capita (nominal) 
 
 max:min ratio CV IQR Gini 
1990 5.15 .44 3066.6 22 
1995 17.8 .54 4518.4 26 
2000 19.5 .77 17199.5 31.4 
2005 43.3 .86 56105.6 34.3 
2009 25.4 .82 84667.1 33 
 
Table 2B: Russia: personal income (nominal) 
 max:min ratio CV IQR Gini 
1990 3.54 .25 343 .11 
1995 13.9 .53 181.3 .24 
2000 13.6 .66 934 .29 
2005 11.2 .59 3059 .28 
2009 7.6 .49 4756.9 .22 
Source: Russian Federal State Statistical Service, 
http://gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/main/  
 
Table 3A: China: Gross Domestic Product per province per capita 
 max:min ratio CV IQR Gini 
1990 7.3 .56 846 .26 
2009 7.7 .59 18555 .30 
 
Table 3B: China: Mean household per capita urban income 
 max:min ratio CV IQR Gini 
2001 2.44 .29 1869.1 .14 
2008 2.43 .27 3672 .13 
Source: Calculated from provincial statistical yearbooks 
 
                                                        
44
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Table 4A: United States: gross state product per capita 
 max:min ratio CV IQR Gini 
1997 4.6 .36 9192 .14 
2009 5 .39 10308 .15 
 
Table 4B: United States: median household income 
 max:min ratio CV IQR Gini 
1989 2.1 .19 9033 .11 
2008-09 1.8 .15 10244.5 .09 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Commerce Department <http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/>; 
US Census Bureau 
 
Table 5: Brazil: state-level mean personal income (constant 1979 prices) 
 max:min ratio CV IQR Gini 
1970 799 1.93 215759.4 73.8 
1980 557 1.87 575093.9 71.3 
1991 215 1.89 620558.9 68.4 
2000 212 1.74 1488237 66.5 
 
Source: Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA) 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econєmica Aplicada 
http://www.ipeadata.gov.br 
 
 
Table 6: India: state-level personal income (constant 1993/94 prices) 
 
 max:min ratio CV IQR Gini 
1993-94 6.51 .456 3614 24 
1998-99 8.32 .53 6425 27.4 
2003-04 9.29 .561 7516 29.6 
 
Source: Indiastat 
http://hollis.harvard.edu/?itemid=|library/m/aleph|009321662 
 
 
 The results indicate that, by all measures, Russia’s cross-regional inequality grew sharply in the 
1990s and early 2000s before subsiding in the late 2000s. The drop was more pronounced for incomes 
than for output, suggesting that the social policies under Putin mitigated income inequality by raising 
incomes at the lower end of the distribution. Over the twenty years between 1990 and 2009, the gap 
between the richest and poorest region doubled for income and more than quintupled for output, and the 
span of the inter-quartile range rose almost 14 times for income and 27 times for output.  For income, 
both the coefficient of variation and the Gini index doubled.  Thus Russia’s level of interregional 
inequality exceeds that of China by a considerable margin using any of these measures despite the fact 
that it has diminished somewhat in the late 2000s, as has that of China.   
 In comparative perspective, Russia’s level of interregional inequality is less extreme. Let us start 
with the United States. Striking is the fact that cross-state disparities in the United States are quite modest 
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compared with any of the other four countries.  Moreover, although interpersonal inequality in the United 
States has risen, inter-state inequality has dropped slightly in recent years.  This suggests that the 
processes fueling our steadily rising income inequality are fairly homogeneous across the entire country 
rather than being concentrated in particular states.  The extraordinary concentration of incomes in the top 
1% and one-tenth of 1% of the population, which, rather than a sharp increase in the number of poor, is 
responsible for the rise in income inequality in America, is evidently a phenomenon occurring nationally 
rather than being concentrated in a few states.
45
 In the US, overall inequality is high (the 90/ 10 decile 
ratio for household income in 2009 was 11.36, and the Gini index was 46.8
46
) but there is relatively little 
difference among the states in their levels of inequalty. Wang Feng notes that if total interpersonal 
inequality is disaggregated into its constituent elements, in the United States, differences in mean incomes 
across cities account for only about 4% of total interpersonal inequality, whereas in China, it accounts for 
half or more of total inequality.
47
 
 We should observe that in the United States, there is no statistical relationship between a state’s 
mean income and its level of inequality once the percent of its population that is black is held constant.  
But the black share of the population is strongly and positively related to a state’s level of income 
inequality (but not to mean income).  In the United States, therefore, as in other societies with deep class, 
ethnic or racial cleavages, the benefits of economic development are strongly skewed in favor of 
privileged strata, who may be distributed in roughly equal shares across territorial units.
48
  In China and 
Russia, in contrast, the gap between the urban and rural populations and across territorial units accounts 
for at least half of total inequality.  
 Russia’s level of interregional inequality is roughly comparable to that of India.  Although we 
have figures only for the 1993-2003 period for India, it appears safe to conclude that India’s economic 
opening increased income disparities across its states.  All four measures of interregional inequality 
showed moderate increases over that decade.  India’s level of interregional inequality as of 2003-04, 
measured by the ratio of the richest to poorest, the cv, and the Gini index, was lower than those of Russia 
at the same time, but slightly higher than the level Russia had reached by the end of the 2000s.  On the 
other hand, none of the countries in this group can touch Brazil for cross-regional inequality, even though 
three of the measures of inter-state inequality showed declines in the 80s and 90s.  The coefficients of 
variation in income for Brazil are four times greater than those of Russia and India, and six times greater 
than those of China.  More than in any of the other countries in the comparison group, processes of 
economic development in Brazil are highly concentrated geographically.  
 For China, interregional inequality fell slightly in the 2000s, but not as much as in Russia, and not 
if the inter-quartile range is taken as the measure.  Over the seven years between 2001 and 2008, the inter-
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quartile range for mean urban household income doubled, although the Gini index and coefficient of 
variation fell very slightly (this would be explained by the fact that the mean rose slightly faster than the 
standard deviation).  But the doubling of the inter-quartile range in a period of less than a decade indicates 
that the spread of values in the middle of the distribution was growing faster than the spread between the 
extremes.  For gross output per province over the 20 years from 1990 to 2009, we see a much larger rise 
in the inter-quartile range as the differentiation among development levels was felt among the great 
majority of provinces.  Even though the mean level of output rose, the standard deviation rose even faster, 
explaining the increase in the coefficient of variation.  However, the gap between the wealthiest and 
poorest provinces grew only slightly.  
 Perhaps the most important question to ask of these (admittedly fragmentary) figures is how 
income growth over time is related to income inequality.  Do regions that experience the fastest growth in 
incomes see the greatest increases in inequality?  Figures 7A, 7B, 8A, and 8B suggest an answer.  They 
indicate that in Russia at the beginning of the 2000s, there was a slightly positive association between 
mean regional household income and regional inequality, which grew still more pronounced by the end of 
the 2000s.  That is, the higher the mean (nominal) income of a region, the greater its decile ratio.  Income 
growth, therefore, was disproportionately concentrated in the highest-income strata, such that the greater 
the growth, the greater the income dispersion.  China shows the opposite trend, at least with respect to 
officially reported urban household incomes.  The slight positive association between province-level 
mean income in 2001 and the calculated decile ratio (excluding Beijing and Shanghai, which did not 
report decile income figures) turned negative by 2008.  Of course, if Beijing and Shanghai had been 
included, it is possible that the statistical association would have been different, since it is likely that 
income growth in those prosperous city-provinces was accompanied by rising income inequality. As we 
noted above, in the richest provinces, the decile ratios for urban household incomes were very high. But it 
shifts from being slightly positive in 2001 to slightly negative in 2008. Still, the figure suggests that there 
is some mitigation of inequality in the poorer regions as the central government has raised incomes in 
poorer provinces through its “Western development” strategy.   
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Figures 7A and 7B: Russia: regional inequality  by income, 2000 and 2009 
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Figures 8A and 8B: China: province-level inequality by income, 2001 and 2008: 
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 Often China’s five coastal provinces, which have seen by far the fastest growth (stimulated by 
deliberate central policy aimed at stimulating investment in the provinces that could benefit the most from 
it), together with the four cities with province status (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and most recently 
Chongqing), are contrasted with the inland provinces that have received less central investment and 
favorable policy treatment.  If we combine the five coastal provinces and four rich municipalities into a 
single category, and compare them with the other 22 provinces, the difference in the increases in their 
incomes and wages is enormous.  In 1980, the average urban household income in the two groups differed 
by only 13%.  By the 2000s the difference was over 50% and there was almost overlap between the two.  
The change in the relative difference in their wage levels was even more dramatic--in 1980, the average 
urban wage in the coastal and municipal group was actually lower than that of the other provinces, 
although the difference was not statistically significant.  By 2008, the average wage in the coastal and 
municipal group was 41% higher.   
 For both sets of provinces, the greatest gains in income went to the highest income decile.  For the 
median non-coastal province, the top decile’s income rose two and one half times from 2001 to 2008, and 
the middle quintile’s income rose 2.2 times.  In the coastal and municipal province group, the median 
province saw an increase of 2.3 times for the top decile, and 1.77 times for the middle quintile. So while 
growth was slightly faster for both the top end and middle income earners in the inland regions, the 
coastal and municipal provinces maintained their lead: as of 2008 both the top decile and the 
middle quintiles in the coastal and municipal group were still over 50% higher in income than their 
inland counterparts.  
 
 
The Implications of Interregional Inequality 
 
 Leaders in Russia and China have both expressed concern over the destabilizing consequences of 
high inequality. A series of statements by Russia’s leaders and reports by leading think tanks suggest 
serious concern about the consequences of rising inequality for long-term stability.  For example, in his 
address to the State Council on February 8, 2008, President Putin declared that the current level of income 
inequality was “absolutely unacceptable” and should be reduced by taking measures to expand the share 
of the middle class in society to 60 or 70%. The head of a think tank affiliated with President Medvedev, 
Igor’ Iurgens, often emphasizes that building the middle class is the key to the success of economic and 
political modernization.  At a conference devoted to the problems of developing the middle class 
sponsored by INSOR in April 2008, he referred to the government’s official “Strategy for the Long-Term 
Social-Economic Development of Russia to the Year 2020” (“Strategiia 2020”) which posits as a state 
goal raising the share of the middle class in the society to 50%. To meet the goal, Iurgens declared that the 
number employed in small business should be raised from 20% or so, as at present, to at least 60%. But as 
Evgenii Gontmakher, deputy director of IMEMO, pointed out at the same conference, the middle class is 
not growing. Gontmakher emphasized that, above all, the middle class needs a sense of security, 
particularly retirement security.
49
 The Higher School of Economics report on living standards cited above 
concludes that “the principal issue for the Russian economy and society is the current level of 
inequality....High level of inequality, the more increasing, can be the source of distrust in society, and 
therefore a threat to the stability [sic].”50 
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 In China, the notion of a “harmonious society” became central in the 2000s as a complement to the 
overriding goal of economic growth. Party General Secretary Hu used the phrase “harmonious society” 
(linked to “social equity and justice” and rising living standards for everyone) no fewer than ten times in 
his address to the 17th Party Congress, as in the following formulation: 
 
We must do our best to ensure that all our people enjoy their rights to education, employment, 
medical and old-age care, and housing, so as to build a harmonious society. 
 
This spring, reacting to the turmoil in the Middle East, a senior official in China responsible for public 
security noted that mass incidents were “frequent occurrences” which he blamed on the fact that “social 
management and services are lagging behind social development.”  He promised to take steps to ensure a 
“harmonious and stable society.”51  President Hu repeatedly calls for reducing “inharmonious factors” by 
a combination of political controls and skillful “stability maintenance.”52 
 It is common to cite the fact of rising mean incomes and rising consumption among the affluent 
strata in China and Russia as evidence of the growth of a “middle class.”  Business interests are, 
understandably, enthusiastic about the rise of the “middle class” in China, a stratum they define as 
households whose disposable incomes are sufficient to acquire durable and luxury goods and that 
hallmark of modern civilization, brand loyalty.  It is a highly marketable category.
53
  For example, 
McKinsey Consulting reports that it believes China will avoid the undesirable “barbell” distribution of 
income characteristic of poor developing countries; they forecast that incomes will rise in all strata, 
although in spurts.  Ultimately, by 2011, they projected that the “lower middle class” would constitute 
about 44% of the urban population, and that by 2025, the upper middle class would comprise half of the 
urban population.  The problem faced by McKinsey’s clients was how to induce Chinese households to 
lower their savings rates and start spending a larger share of their income on consumer goods.
54
  For the 
Chinese leadership, growth of the middle class is desirable.  It would contribute to social stability by 
reducing the gap between rich and poor, and establish aspirational goals for the poor.
55
  
 An expanding middle class is also regarded as desirable by commercial interests in Russia, who 
define it as an economic stratum capable of purchasing an apartment, a car, and other high-priced items; 
the state insurance company estimated that about 20% of the population fell into this category, ie 
households with at least $25,000 per year in income.
56
  Sociologists, however, define the middle class 
differently.  Most define it according to the convergence of income, occupation, education, and self-
identification.  Most would place the share of the middle class in contemporary Russian society at 15-
20%.
57
   
 However, scholarly studies of middle class development in both societies reach similar 
conclusions: by any reasonable definition, the middle class is deeply heterogeneous and does not 
constitute a self-interested force. In Russia, approxmiately half the individuals that can be considered 
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middle class are employed in the state sector as state officials, military officers, teachers, and others 
whose livelihoods are paid by the state.  Their outlook on distributional issues therefore tends to differ 
from those whose livelihoods depend on entrepreneurship.
58
  Similarly, studies of the Chinese middle 
class tend to consider it highly dependent on state officials for their privileges, and certainly not a 
homogeneous or cohesive social aggregate.  Some observers argue that the regime and the “middle class” 
have formed a tacit coalition to prevent any serious redistribution of income or privilege, an alliance the 
regime has reinforced by its dark warnings of the potential for social unrest.
59
   
 Moreover, although the middle-income property-owning strata in China are undoubtedly 
expanding as a share of the population faster than in Russia, the rapid increase of top-end incomes in both 
countries that we have documented makes it hard to judge whether the income distribution is becoming 
more diamond-like in shape or whether most income gains are going to the top few percentiles of the 
distribution, as in the United States. The wider the gap between the mean and the median income level as 
inequality widens, the greater the potential pressure for redistribution, and hence for social and political 
tension.
60
  In contrast is a situation that William Easterly describes as the “middle class consensus,” where 
a majority of people share in the benefits of growth and there is no wide polarization across social classes 
or ethnic groups.
61
  For both Russia and China, therefore, Eva Bellin’s portrait of “contingent democrats,” 
social groups in late-developing capitalism whose heterogeneity and dependence on state power and 
privilege undermine their capacity for collective action, appears to capture an important truth about the 
character of the middle class.
62
    
 Similarly, the spatial distribution of the groups labelled as middle class is crucial to the social and 
political consequences of their rise.  For China, a middle income stratum concentrated in large, prosperous 
cities, residing in gated compounds and fearful of the discontent of rural and migrant workers, and heavily 
made up of public sector employees, is likely to support the regime’s authoritarian policies to the extent 
that they preserve stability and defend against strong redistributive pressure.  Observers of China differ 
over the degree to which the center has preserved the capacity to reduce interregional differentials.  Most 
believe that after 1993, a fiscal reform enables the center to realize a larger share of tax revenues and use 
them to redress regional inequality.  In particular, the state was able to target central investment funds in 
the “Western Development Program,” which has raised incomes in several less-developed provinces 
through infra-structure development.
63
  However, Barry Naughton argues that the longer-term success of 
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such state efforts may undermine incentives for locally-generated productive investment and fail to reduce 
disparities between eastern and western provinces.  The state has also been able to expand pension and 
health care coverage to a wider share of the population, including in the countryside.  Pension reform 
reflects greater cenral control over the pooling of pension funds.
64
  Municipal governments now provide a 
minimal subsistence subsidy to the indigent.
65
 
 Similarly, in Russia, the vigorous efforts under Putin to respond to the 2008-2009 crash by 
protecting incomes at the low end, though such measures as unemployment assistance programs, state aid 
to troubled enterprises and banks, and significant increases in pension levels, have brought about a 
levelling off in the rise of both interpersonal and interregional inequality. State infra-structure investment 
through the “national projects” have undoubtedly also boosted incomes in poorer regions.  Incomes in the 
countryside have also benefited from Putin policies aimed at developing private farming.
66
  The 
government’s ability to direct state investment to offset differences in rates of growth and income levels 
across regions depends, though, on revenues from resource exports.  The calamitous effects of the 2008-
2009 financial crash, when Russia’s GDP shrank by 7.9% in 2009 alone, shows how vulnerable Russia is 
in this respect. The government recognizes the problem.  The deputy minister of economic development 
recently declared that if Russia did not diversify its economic model away from its dependence on natural 
resource exports, the middle class’s development would be stunted and inequality would remain 
unacceptably high.  Inequality in income and wealth, he stated, “is one of the most important factors of 
social justice.”67 
 I have argued that in Russia (and to a large extent in China as well), interpersonal income 
inequality rises and falls with income growth, and that interregional inequality is a function of trends in 
interpersonal inequality.  The dismantling of the Soviet-era system linking employment, wages, and social 
entitlements has given way to a partially decentralized, partially commercialized and privatized set of 
mechanisms for determining earnings, employment, access to education and health care, pension rights 
and other social benefits.  For the most part, the existing system of social policy is primarily aimed at 
preventing social unrest rather than reshaping private incentives for investment in productive activity 
yielding a long-term return.  It is defensive rather than transformative.  In Russia, more than in China, 
policies governing the labor market, pensions, social insurance contributions, and other issues are subject 
to deliberative bargaining involving business interests, and, to a lesser degree, labor.  In China, the 
influence of organized business and labor is weaker still.
 68
  As weak as corporatist institutions are, 
however, the role of partisan electoral competition in aggregating and resolving redistributive conflicts 
between the competing interests of large social collectivities is entirely absent in both countries.   
 Thus in both Russia and China, the inherited authoritarian features of each regime leave broad 
social groups such as pensioners, labor, entrepreurs and public sector employees without effective 
representation and therefore without the means to take part in the formation of social policy.  State 
officials retain wide autonomy to demand rents in the form of fees, tributes, gifts and bribes from 
economic agents as a cost of doing business but, paradoxically, lack the ability or the will to make more 
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than marginal adjustments in the social welfare system.  Both states have dismantled the socialist 
universalism of the old entitlements system by privatizing, commercializing, and decentralizing public 
services rather than adopting a redistributive social policy negotiated between opposing interests. Both 
have favored business interests by lowering social taxes and benefits.  The social policy that results is 
defensive: it mitigates some of the extremes of inter-regional and interpersonal iequality but fails to 
encourage joint investment by business and labor in productivity-enhancing public goods such as 
education and health care.   
 The combination of authoritarian political institutions and liberal economic institutions therefore 
leaves the state vulnerable to the pressure of those interests that produce rapid growth, such as natural 
resource sectors in Russia and foreign investors in China. Stronger institutions for consultation and 
coordination between the state, business, and labor could alleviate some of the redistributive tensions that 
result and that make entrepreneurial and professional groups dependent on the maintenance of 
authoritarian regime institutions.  This is evident on the basis of my examination of the variation in 
regional regimes in Russia.
69
  There I found that regional regimes that had built sturdier mechanisms for 
overcoming the coordination dilemmas on the part of local enterprises (in the form of directors’ councils, 
parliamentary committees, business associations, and the like), the local authorities were also able to 
induce cooperation between firms and the government over the sharing of the costs and benefits of reform.  
The greater the level of pluralism and openness at the regional level, I found, the higher the investment 
rates on the part of firms, the higher the social spending by government, the lower the poverty rate, and 
the faster the income growth.  Income inequality, however, was also higher.   
 A transitional state where administrative control has been weakened, whether by decentralization 
or the loss of traditional centralized monitoring mechanisms, faces a trade-off between distributional 
equality and autonomy for firms and social organizations.  China and Russia have given regions and firms 
a great deal of autonomy to pursue their economic strategies, but have relinquished much of their power 
to supply public goods and services impartially, let alone to carry out a redistributive policy across 
individuals, generations and regions.  Expanding the participatory arena for business and labor, and 
eventually for competitive political parties, would be one way to recapture control over the broader 
environment of economic reform.   Russia undoubtedly has a more well-articulated system of consultation 
between interest-aggregating associations representing business and labor at the central level and in many 
regions than does China.  But its growth rates are far slower than China’s and the benefits of growth, in its 
highly resource-dominated economy, are far more unequally distributed across its vast territory.  China’s 
institutions for consultation and coordination are more weakly developed than Russia’s, but it has made 
up for this by its remarkably high rate of economic growth.  Nevertheless, in both states, institutional 
weaknesses, reflected in the rising levels of interpersonal and interregional inequality, have subverted the 
state’s capacity to achieve its larger strategic goals.  
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